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Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson have each offered accounts of how 
music can express emotions. Davies’s ‘Appearance Emotionalism’ holds 
that music can be expressive of emotion due to a resemblance between 
its dynamic properties and those of human behaviour typical of people 
feeling that emotion, while Levinson’s ‘Hypothetical Emotionalism’ con-
tends that a piece is expressive when it can be heard as the expression 
of the emotion of a hypothetical agent or imagined persona. These have 
been framed as opposing positions but I show that, on one understand-
ing of ‘expressing’ which they seem to share, each entails the other and so 
there is no real debate between them. However, Levinson’s account can be 
read according to another—and arguably more philosophically interest-
ing—understanding of ‘expressing’ whereas Davies’s account cannot as 
easily be so read. I argue that this reading of Hypothetical Emotionalism 
can account for much of our talk about music in terms of emotions but 
must answer another question—viz., how composers or performers can 
express emotions through music—to explain this relation between music 
and emotion. I suggest that this question can be answered by drawing on 
R. G. Collingwood’s theory of artistic expression.
Keywords: Musical expression; Stephen Davies; appearance emotio na-
lism; Jerrold Levinson; hypothetical emotionalism; R. G. Collingwood.
1. Introduction
It is common to speak of music in terms of emotions—to say that a 
song is sad, joyful, sombre, serene, etc.—and to describe pieces of mu-
sic as expressing emotions, e.g., to characterize Beethoven’s “Kreutzer 
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Sonata” as expressing agitation and pent-up energy, Vivaldi’s “Spring” 
as expressing exuberant playfulness, and so forth. However, explaining 
just what is meant by such turns of phrase, and how a piece of music 
can be, say, sad, or how a performance of that piece can express sad-
ness (or whatever other emotion), is a tricky business. On the one hand, 
musical compositions and performances are not subjects that can feel 
emotions, let alone externalize or express them; on the other, such talk 
does seem genuinely to describe a quality that we perceive or experi-
ence as somehow belonging to or being ‘in’ the music.
While many philosophers have endeavoured to explain how music 
and emotion are related and to account for talk of music expressing 
emotions,1 this paper focuses on two prominent contemporary theories 
of musical expression: Stephen Davies’s Appearance Emotionalism 
(AE) and Jerrold Levinson’s Hypothetical Emotionalism (HE). Davies 
and Levinson have advanced their theories in multiple places,2 but my 
focus will be on their 2006 papers “Artistic Expression and the Hard 
Case of Pure Music” and “Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-as-
expression,” respectively, since these contain the most fully worked-out 
and defended versions of their positions and since they explicitly frame 
their positions as standing in opposition to one another. This last point 
is important, as part of my aim is to question the view that these posi-
tions are opposing sides in a debate. I argue that, on a commonly held 
understanding of ‘expression’ that seems to be accepted by both Davies 
and Levinson, each position entails the other and so they are exten-
sionally equivalent with matching truth conditions: that is, in order for 
one of these accounts of musical expression to be true, the other, I will 
argue, must also be true.
If I am right about these positions being compatible and even exten-
sionally equivalent, one might wonder what philosophical problem is at 
stake in the purported debate. Although I argue that this compatibility 
obtains on one understanding of ‘expression’ and its distinction from, 
and relation to, what could be called ‘expressiveness,’ there is another 
understanding of expression according to which HE can plausibly be 
read. I argue that when HE is read in this way it no longer presupposes 
or is entailed by AE, making the two positions genuine alternatives. 
Moreover, this reading leads to HE being of greater philosophical in-
terest and makes it better able than AE to account for nuances in our 
sometimes-ambiguous language surrounding expression in the arts. 
The real (or at least more philosophically interesting) problem in the 
debate on musical expression, I contend, involves the second sense of 
‘expression’ and the philosophical problems that it raises—and which 
HE, but not AE, goes some way towards solving. These problems can 
be solved, I suggest, by looking to R. G. Collingwood’s answer to a cru-
cial question about this second sense of ‘expression’ and how it applies 
1 See Matravers 2007, Matravers 2010, and Kania 2017: §3, for overviews.
2 See especially Davies 1994, Davies 1999, Levinson 1990, and Levinson 1996.
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in the case of music, where HE raises but does not itself answer this 
question.
My discussion and argument proceeds as follows. In section 2 I out-
line Davies’s AE and Levinson’s HE, along with arguments against 
each position and their responses. In section 3 I argue that AE and HE 
are not only compatible but equivalent on an understanding of ‘expres-
siveness’ and ‘expression’ that is plausibly at play in the arguments for 
both, but that a disagreement arises on another understanding of ‘ex-
pression’ with which HE is more compatible albeit incomplete until a 
further question is answered. Section 4 summarizes Collingwood’s the-
ory of expression and shows how it can answer this question, and thus 
how it can complement HE so as to better explain musical expression. 
I conclude by considering the strengths of HE when it is supplemented 
with the Collingwoodian notion of expression in its primary sense.
2. Davies’s and Levinson’s 
accounts of musical expression
In his review of philosophical discussions of musical expression, Derek 
Matravers identifi es four related but distinct questions of interest: “1. 
What is it about [a piece of] music that causes us to hear it as expres-
sive? 2. What does ‘the music is sad’ mean? 3. What is it to hear music 
as expressive?” and “4. What is the connection between the expressive 
qualities of music and its value?” (Matravers 2007: 374). Since Davies 
and Levinson do not address the fourth question in the papers I am 
discussing, I shall bracket it for now. In regards to the second question, 
one thing that ‘the music is sad’ cannot coherently mean is that an oc-
current emotion or psychological state is attributed to the music itself, 
since pieces of music are not the kinds of things that can have or be in 
such states. It would seem that the statement is metaphorical (or per-
haps ‘elliptical,’ or a literal ‘secondary’ use of emotion terms; see Davies 
2006: 183 and Young 2014: 3–5) and really attributes a property to the 
music that is related in some way to sadness as a felt state, i.e., in its 
primary sense. The question becomes: what is this property and how is 
it related to ordinary human sadness?
Davies and Levinson agree that an acceptable answer must centre 
on a property of the music rather than the composer, performer, or lis-
tener, and one that is heard or apprehended directly in the music rath-
er than one that is inferred based on other of the music’s properties,3 
3 Levinson calls these conditions the “externality requirement” and the 
“immediacy requirement”, respectively (see Levinson 1996: 91–2). Davies’s insistence 
that expressiveness is an “objective” property of some pieces of music (Davies 2006: 
182) corresponds to Levinson’s externality requirement—although, importantly, 
Davies clarifi es that ‘objective’ need not mean “independent-of-human-experience”, 
as he plausibly takes expressiveness to be a response-dependent property. Davies 
also criticizes accounts of expressiveness that involve “a mediated process of abstract 
symbolization or indirect representation” as failing to explain “the phenomenal 
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which rules out accounts that explain music’s relation to emotion in 
terms of the arousal of emotion in listeners or the communication of a 
musician’s occurrent emotion. This is not to deny that music can arouse 
emotions or manifest what a composer or performer feels but that these 
phenomena exhaust music’s connection to emotion, from which it fol-
lows that expressiveness is a distinct—though possibly related—phe-
nomenon. This seems right, since one can recognize that a piece of 
music is sad, angry, calm, etc. without feeling this way oneself, and 
a composer or musician can write or play an expressive piece without 
needing to feel the emotion it expresses when composing or perform-
ing it; as James Young notes, “Mozart … was distressed when writing 
some of his sunniest music” (Young 2014: 6).
Davies and Levinson also agree in limiting their discussion to so-
called ‘pure’ music—i.e., instrumental music without an accompany-
ing text such as lyrics, program notes, or a descriptive title that could 
evoke or suggest certain emotions such as “Ode to Joy” or “Morning 
Mood”—and to exclude purely conventional associations, since any ex-
pressiveness in these cases would not necessarily come from the music 
itself but the interaction of the instrumental music with the lyrics, text, 
or conventions (cf. Matravers 2007: 373–74). How, then, do their ac-
counts of musical expressiveness differ?
2.1 Appearance Emotionalism (AE)
Davies explains the relation between a piece of music and the emo-
tion of which it is expressive as one of resemblance, with properties 
of the music resembling expressive human behaviour, i.e., behaviours 
typical of people who feel that emotion. In this Davies follows Peter 
Kivy (1989), who understands expressiveness as a matter of resem-
bling, or sharing what he called a ‘contour’ with, the way someone who 
feels a certain emotion will typically look or sound, or perhaps with the 
phenomenological character of that emotion.4 For example, the faces 
of basset hounds and St. Bernards have a sad look due to their resem-
blance to facial expressions typical of sad humans—large eyes, a droop-
ing mouth, slack muscles, etc.—, and weeping willow trees are said to 
be reminiscent or expressive of sadness in virtue of the resemblance 
between the drooping, downward turn of their branches and the slump 
or droop in posture of sad people, or perhaps the feelings of heaviness 
and being weighed down that are part of the phenomenology of sad-
ness. Whereas Kivy and other resemblance theorists look to facial or 
vocal expressions or the phenomenology typical of those feeling an emo-
tion, Davies concentrates on the dynamic character of human behav-
iours such as “gait, attitude, air, carriage, posture, and comportment” 
vivacity with which we experience expressiveness in music” (Davies 2006: 184), 
where this corresponds to Levinson’s immediacy requirement.
4 For the view that expressiveness is a matter of resemblance to the 
phenomenological structure or felt character of an emotion, see Budd 1995.
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(Davies 2006: 182). For example, people who feel sad typically walk 
with a heavy gait and move slowly, slump or droop in their posture, 
have a downcast gaze, etc., where these behaviours are constitutive of 
someone having ‘a sad look,’ whether or not they feel sad ‘on the inside.’ 
Finding the notion of an emotion having a fi xed phenomenological pro-
fi le to be implausible or imprecise, Davies focuses on these features 
since he takes them to most closely resemble an element of music, viz., 
its “temporally unfolding dynamic structure” (Davies 2006: 181), in-
sofar as both involve a perception of movement, and since he sees the 
cross-modal resemblance between seeing—or perhaps kinaesthetically 
feeling—a certain sort of bodily movement and hearing the dynamic 
structure of music to be stronger than the resemblance between, e.g., 
the way an object such as a face looks and the way a song sounds.5
Davies’s position, which he calls Appearance Emotionalism, can be 
stated in formal terms as: (AE) a piece of music P is expressive of an emo-
tion E if and only if the dynamic structure of P perceptually resembles 
the dynamic structure of the types of behaviour characteristic of a per-
son who feels E. For a piece of music to be expressive of sadness, then, 
is for its dynamic audible properties to resemble the “sad fi gure” cut by 
“someone who is stooped over, dragging, faltering, subdued, and slow 
in his movements,” e.g., by the piece being “slow, quiet, with heavy or 
thick harmonic bass textures, with underlying patterns of unresolved 
tension, with dark timbres, and a recurrently downward impetus” (Da-
vies 2006: 182). Likewise, a piece with a quick tempo, a lightness of 
tone or timbre, rising notes or a structural pattern that gives a sense of 
upward movement, harmonic resolution, etc., would be expressive of a 
positive emotion such as joy insofar as its dynamic structure resembled 
that of the behaviour characteristic of joyful people, such as an ease 
and lack of hesitation, lifting one’s gaze upwards, dancing, skipping, or 
walking with a bounce in one’s step, feeling free or uplifted, etc.
Davies’s argument in favour of AE primarily takes the form of re-
plies to objections, where these replies help to clarify aspects of AE 
so as to avoid confusions and to show how AE can account for certain 
aspects commonly attributed to music that might be thought to pose a 
challenge, such as the worry that AE would restrict the range of emo-
tions of which music can be expressive in a way that would fail to cap-
ture the expressive nuance and subtlety that is often claimed of mu-
sic.6 The closest Davies comes to giving a positive argument in support 
of AE is noting that it “provides … for the phenomenal vivacity with 
which we experience expressiveness in music” (Davies 2006: 184), i.e., 
our sense of directly apprehending an emotional quality in the mu-
5 While he doesn’t deny that music can resemble expressive human vocalizations, 
he argues that the resemblance here is also mainly to do with the dynamic structure 
of vocal sounds, i.e., their “articulation, pitch, intensity, and periodicity of phrase 
lengths and shapes,” rather than their timbre or infl ection (Davies 2006: 181).
6 These objections and replies are found in Davies 2006: 182–87, with the worry 
about the restricted range of expression being discussed on 185.
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sic as we hear it, in ways that other accounts do not. James Young 
has recently provided further support for AE by citing empirical evi-
dence that people experience certain dynamic structures or ‘contours’ 
of movement as being shared by instrumental music and human bodily 
motion, with these structures being commonly associated in each case, 
and often cross-culturally, with the same general emotion types (Young 
2014: 19–24).
Against AE, Levinson raises the objection that talk of a resem-
blance between the aural appearance of a piece of music and the visual 
appearance of some type of human behaviour is too vague to ground a 
theory of expressiveness, since everything may be said to resemble, or 
be similar to, everything else to some degree. “The issue,” he contends, 
“then becomes one of how similar such an appearance must be to one 
presented by human behaviour in order to constitute” the music’s ex-
pressiveness of the emotion associated with that behaviour (Levinson 
2006: 197). This objection is weak, since it is not clear why AE must 
specify a precise degree of resemblance that must be met, or at least 
not one that could be assessed independently of listeners’ responses to 
music. It might appear circular to say that the music must be similar 
enough to some human behaviour to the degree that it is reminiscent 
of, or heard as, this behaviour; however, since this property is agreed to 
be response-dependent, the fact that it can only be established in refer-
ence to a listener’s experience should not be seen as a problem.
There is a stronger objection to be made, however, based on a dis-
tinction Levinson makes between something being expressive of an 
emotion and something merely having “an emotional quality, in vir-
tue of suggesting an emotion through its appearance” (Levinson 2006: 
201). Since, as Levinson also notes, the notion of expressiveness de-
pends on the concept of expression, and expression is generally agreed 
to be primarily a matter of a person or agent’s ‘inner states’ being made 
manifest through outward appearances (Levinson 2006: 192),7 the wor-
ry is that AE might only give a theory of what it is for music to sug-
gest emotions and not of how music can be expressive of them, since a 
theory of the latter must make some reference to the primary sense of 
expression. This is where Levinson’s theory comes in.
2.2 Hypothetical Emotionalism (HE)
Insisting that talk of something expressing or being expressive of an 
emotion is parasitic on the primary sense of ‘expression,’ according to 
which only psychological states can be expressed and hence only psy-
chological agents can literally be said to express them, Levinson argues 
that in order for someone to experience a piece of music itself as expres-
sive it is not enough that one registers a resemblance between proper-
ties of the music and properties of expressive behaviour. Rather, one 
7 Levinson cites Tormey 1971, Vermazen 1986, and Ridley 2003 in support.
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must hear the music as if it were itself an expression in the primary 
sense; in other words, the music needs to be heard as an expressive act. 
Levinson further argues that hearing a piece of music as an expressive 
act involves imagining an agent or persona to whom one can attribute 
the act. This agent or persona need not be thought to actually exist but 
only be imagined as hypothetical; hence Levinson calls his position Hy-
pothetical Emotionalism, or the Hearability-as-Expression view.
Levinson states this formally as: (HE) “a passage of music P is ex-
pressive of an emotion E if and only if P, in context, is readily heard, 
by a listener experienced in the genre in question, as an expression of 
E” (Levinson 2006: 193), where elsewhere he phrases this last clause 
as “as (or as if it were) a sui generis8 personal expression of [E] by some 
(imaginatively indeterminate) individual” (Levinson 1990: 338). The 
requirement that a hypothetical persona or “imaginatively indetermi-
nate individual” be imagined when hearing a piece of music as expres-
sive is, for Levinson, a matter of logical entailment. If expression just 
is the externalization of an ‘internal’ psychological state via intentional 
‘external’ behaviour, e.g., gesture, then to experience a piece of music as 
expressive—e.g., as an expression of sadness—can only mean to experi-
ence it as a gesture that externalizes a feeling—e.g., sadness—where 
the notions of behaviour or gesture and an ‘inner’ state presuppose an 
agent whose state it is and who is gesturing or behaving.9
One advantage of HE over AE is that it is better able to account for 
music’s capacity to express complex, cognitively-laden emotions such as 
hope or embarrassment along with simple emotions such as sadness or 
joy, where AE would seem to restrict music’s expressive range to emo-
tions of the latter sort.10 The strongest objection, however, is that even 
if it is possible to imagine a persona engaging in expressive behaviour 
and to hear the music as this expression, some or most people do not in 
fact engage in this imaginative activity when registering music as ex-
pressive (see Davies 2006: 190). In response, Levinson maintains that 
the imaginary persona needs only to be imagined “in a backgrounded 
manner” and is “almost entirely indefi nite, a sort of minimal person, 
characterized only by the emotion we hear it to be expressing and the 
musical gesture through which it does so” (Levinson 2006: 193–94), 
8 In his 2006 paper, Levinson sets aside the ‘sui generis’ claim in response to 
worries from Matravers (1998) about the coherence of the notion of a sui generis 
mode of expression; see Levinson 2006: 194.
9 The persona theory of expression, or something quite like it, is also found in 
Cochrane 2010a (see especially pp. 203–4), Cochrane 2010b, Karl & Robinson 1997, 
Robinson 1994, Robinson 2005 (see especially p. 320), and, with a variation, Walton 
1994. Notably, it can be found in the work of music theorist Edward Cone prior to its 
appearance in the work of philosophers of music (see Cone 1974).
10 A defender of AE could insist that music can only objectively be expressive 
of such simple emotions, with more complex expressions requiring more subjective 
input or projection from the listener. However, see Levinson 1990 for an extended 
example of how a piece of music can express the cognitively complex emotion (or 
emotion-like psychological state) of hope. See also Karl and Robinson 1997.
78 D. Collins, Davies and Levinson on the Musical Expression of Emotion
and hence need not manifest in any overt or complex imaginary activ-
ity on the part of listeners such as imagining a character engaged in a 
narrative (cf. Davies 2006: 190). Rather, all that is needed is for one to 
hear passages of the music as gestures, i.e., to hear the music not just 
as movement but as action, where this implies an agent. For example, 
hearing notes that rise in pitch and increase in tempo as a ‘fl ourish’ 
expressing joy doesn’t require one to envision, e.g., a character jumping 
into the air, but only involves hearing the musical movement as some-
one’s act of fl ourishing, with this ‘someone’ not needing to be any more 
detailed than the idea of some-fl ourisher-in-general.
Moreover, because it is “backgrounded,” not all listeners need be 
overtly aware of their hearing the music as the gesture of someone 
gesturing: it is enough that they consciously hear it as a gesture. An 
even stronger reply to this worry is available to Levinson, which is to 
note that HE, as defi ned, does not require every listener to actually 
imagine a persona when listening to a piece of music in order for it 
to be expressive but only requires that the piece be “readily heard as” 
the expression of such a persona. In other words, all that is required is 
that the musical movement be disposed to be heard as the intentional 
movement or gesture of a hypothetical agent, i.e., that the music be 
conducive to being a ‘soundtrack,’ so to speak, for an imagined char-
acter’s expressive behaviour, with this not needing be realized in the 
experience of every listener who fi nds the piece expressive.11
3. What’s the problem?
Since both AE and HE can be defended against objections that have 
been raised against them, and since both are prima facie plausible (or 
at least HE is when understood in terms of the minimal ‘backgrounded’ 
persona that Levinson takes it to require, as opposed to some more elab-
orate imaginative activity), we might agree with Matravers in thinking 
that we “have reached a[n] impasse” in the debate (Matravers 2007: 
378–79). One reason for this, I suggest, is that Davies and Levinson’s 
accounts offer answers to two different, though connected, questions: 
in terms of the four questions that Matravers notes can be asked about 
musical expression, AE is most naturally seen as primarily answering 
the fi rst question, viz. “What is it about [a piece of] music that causes us 
to hear it as expressive?”, with HE primarily answering the third, viz. 
11 These responses also takes care of the objection that HE puts no constraint 
on the details of what multiple listeners, or the same listener on multiple occasions, 
imagine(s) when listening to a piece of music, which is thought to pose a problem for 
the convergence of different people’s expressive judgments of the same piece of music 
(Davies 2006: 190; cf. Kania 2017: §3.1). If such detailed imaginings are not required 
by HE for one to register a piece of music as expressive of some emotion, the worry 
evaporates. While different listeners could engage in such diverse imaginings, HE 
would require the imagined personas, gestures, and narrative all to involve hearing 
the piece as the expression of the same sort of emotion, i.e., the emotion of which it 
is disposed to be heard as the expression.
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“What is it to hear music as expressive?” (Matravers 2007: 374, my em-
phases). And we might think, along with Collingwood, that two state-
ments (or theories, etc.) can only confl ict if they are meant to answer 
the same question (see Collingwood 1939: 33) and hence that there is 
no actual debate to be had between Davies’s and Levinson’s positions.
There is a risk, however, of dismissing the debate too quickly, since 
both positions have something to say on both of the aforementioned 
questions. Even if AE holds that a resemblance between certain prop-
erties of music and certain properties of expressive human behaviour 
causes us to hear it as expressive, this implies an answer to the third 
question—viz., that to hear music as expressive just is to perceive this 
resemblance—where this might still confl ict with HE’s answer to this 
question. Likewise, even if HE holds that what it is to hear music as 
expressive is to hear it imaginatively as the expression of a hypotheti-
cal agent in a minimal sense, an answer to the fi rst question is implied 
here too—viz., that a disposition of the music to be readily heard in this 
way is what causes us to hear it as expressive—where this might still 
confl ict with AE’s answer to this question. However, I contend that the 
answers AE and HE give to both questions are compatible and that, on 
one reading of ‘expression’, the positions are in fact equivalent; thus, 
if both theories do involve this sense of ‘expression’, there is no real 
debate between them.
3.1 Are AE and HE equivalent?
It is worth noting that Levinson is generally sympathetic to much of 
what AE claims; as Andrew Kania notes, Levinson “agrees that there 
is an important resemblance between the contour of music expressive 
of an emotion and the contour of typical behavioural expressions of that 
emotion” (Kania 2017: §3.1; cf. Levinson 2006: 196). While accepting 
the “basic thrust” of AE, Levinson’s main reason for rejecting it as an 
adequate explanation of musical expressiveness is his worry about the 
notion of a resemblance between two things that do not appear “pre-
cisely” alike but are only held to be similar in appearance (Levinson 
2006: 196–97). However, it is not clear why a piece of music and some 
expressive human movement must be precisely the same in appear-
ance for AE to work. With Levinson’s “major qualms” (Levinson 2006: 
206) thus diffused, what remains is Levinson’s agreement with the cen-
tral condition of AE.
The compatibility of HE and AE is not only a matter of Levinson 
accepting that expressive music will, in its dynamic properties, gener-
ally resemble or share a contour with the dynamic properties of the 
kind of human behaviour that would typically be expressive of the 
same emotion. This resemblance is entailed by HE’s central condition, 
since resembling human behaviour that is expressive of some emotion 
is a necessary condition for a piece of music to be readily hearable-as 
an agent’s expression of that emotion. Consider: if a piece of music is 
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disposed to be heard by attentive listeners as if it were an expression 
in the primary sense, i.e., as a persona’s gesture that expresses that 
persona’s feeling, this will involve it disposing the listener to imagine 
such a gesture. If so, the piece (or the properties of the piece that so 
dispose it) must be perceptually similar to the relevantly analogous 
properties of the gesture, where this gesture is an instance of the sort 
of characteristically expressive human behaviour that Davies makes 
central to AE. That this is so can be seen when Levinson writes that, on 
his view, expressive music is “heard as doing something … analogous 
to human gesturing and vocalizing and expressive movement, in all its 
forms” (Levinson 1996: 115, my emphasis).12 This is even more explicit 
in Levinson’s earlier claim that “qualitative similarities and structural 
resemblances between the sound of a passage and standard behaviours 
for expressing α will typically play the largest role in bringing about … 
hearability [as an expression of α]” (Levinson 1990: 339).
That AE is a necessary condition of HE might suggest that AE offers 
a more fundamental explanation of musical expressiveness. However, 
in a similar move, Levinson argues that resemblance theories such as 
AE presuppose and depend on some form of ‘hearability-as’. “There is,” 
he writes, “simply no independent conception of and no access to what 
Davies calls musical emotion-characteristics-in-appearance apart from 
satisfaction of the hearability-in-the-music-of-an-expressing-of-emo-
tion condition vis-à-vis attuned listeners” (Levinson 2006: 197). That is 
to say, one can perceive—rather than, e.g., infer—an objective resem-
blance between a piece of music and human behaviour only if there is 
something about the music that makes it conducive to imagining this 
behaviour carried out by someone or other.13 And this holds whether or 
not a particular listener does in fact imagine this—although it is hard 
to conceive what it would be for someone to perceive the resemblance 
without in some way imagining the actions that make up the behaviour 
to which one perceives a resemblance.
If this is correct, then AE will entail HE. That is, if the dynamic 
structure of P perceptually resembles the dynamic structure of the sort 
of behaviour characteristic of a person who feels E, then P is readily 
heard (in the proper context, by a suitably receptive listener, etc.) as, 
or as if it were, an expression of E by some imagined or hypothetical 
persona. But if I am also correct about HE entailing AE, it will also 
work the other way around: that is, if P is readily heard (in the proper 
context, by a suitably receptive listener, etc.) as, or as if it were, an 
expression of E by some imagined or hypothetical persona, then the 
dynamic structure of P perceptually resembles the dynamic structure 
12 Cf. Young 2014: 9, where he writes that “a work can be perceived as the 
expression of an emotion only if it resembles the expression of emotion” (my 
emphasis).
13 Cf. Davies 1999: 283, where he writes “I think that we can and must hear music 
as like human action already at the stage of hearing it as presenting expressive 
aspects” (my emphasis).
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of the sort of behaviour characteristic of a person who feels E. And if 
both are correct it means that each position entails the other, making 
them (at least extensionally) equivalent, sharing the same truth condi-
tions: the dynamic structure of P perceptually resembles the dynamic 
structure of the sort of behaviour characteristic of a person who feels E 
if and only if P is readily heard (in the proper context and by a suitably 
receptive listener, etc.) as, or as if it were, an expression of E by some 
imagined or hypothetical persona. Even if we do not accept that the 
two positions do not confl ict because they answer different questions, 
the (apparently different) answer that each position gives to the same 
question will entail the truth of the other position, so they cannot con-
fl ict for this reason. The sense that the debate between these positions 
is at an irresolvable impasse is, I suggest, due to there being no actual 
debate to be had—at least not if AE and HE are understood according 
to the conception of expression in its primary sense with which Davies 
and Levinson are likely operating (more on which below).
Levinson pre-emptively objects to this argument when, after claim-
ing that hearability-as-expression is often based on qualitative and 
structural resemblances between music and typically expressive be-
haviour (Levinson 1990: 339, quoted above), he writes that “it would 
be a mistake … to simply regard such hearability as equivalent to the 
behaviour” it resembles (Ibid., original emphasis). He gives two rea-
sons for this. One is that it would not account for other things on which 
he claims hearability can also be based, e.g. conventional associations. 
The other is that it would overlook instances where hearability is based 
on a resemblance “to certain natural phenomena that have long been 
found expressive” (Ibid., emphasis removed) rather than to human be-
haviour. However, neither reason successfully counts against the sort 
of hearability that Levinson posits and expressive human behaviour 
being (extensionally) equivalent. With regard to the fi rst, expressive-
ness based on conventional associations will not be ‘objective’ enough 
as a property of the music to meet Levinson’s externality requirement 
since the convention a listener might associate with the sound of the 
music stands outside the music itself, whereas it is part of HE that the 
disposition to be heard as an expression of a certain emotion is an ob-
jective response-dependent property of the music alone.14 With regard 
to the second, if hearability-as-expression sometimes involves resem-
blance to a natural phenomenon rather than to human behaviour, it’s 
not clear that the expressiveness attributed to this phenomenon would 
not itself be an instance of AE, i.e., due to a resemblance between the 
natural phenomenon and characteristically expressive human behav-
iour. Since neither reason holds good, the pre-emptive objection fails to 
count against my argument above for the equivalence of AE and HE.
14 Cf. Davies 2006: 179–80, for a dismissal of conventional associations as 
explaining the kind of expressiveness that is in question for both AE and HE, i.e., 
expressiveness as an objective property of ‘pure music’.
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3.2 Expression, emoting, and betrayal
Even if AE and HE were combined to explain musical expressiveness 
in terms of a property or set of properties a piece of music can have in 
virtue of which it both resembles and is disposed to be heard as expres-
sive human behaviour, this explanation would be incomplete. This is 
because both accounts ‘pass the buck’ insofar as their explanations of 
expressiveness appeal to the concept of expression in its primary sense. 
For AE, the expressiveness of a piece of music is explained in terms 
of the expressiveness of the human behaviour which it resembles—
e.g., that it has ‘a sad look’, etc.—, where this is in turn explained by 
its being the sort of behaviour that typically counts as an expression 
of the feelings of the one who is so behaving: e.g., being stooped over 
and walking with a slow, heavy, dragging gait is expressive of sadness 
because moving this way typically expresses sadness in the primary 
sense. For HE, the appeal to expression is more direct: the music’s ex-
pressiveness is explained by its being readily heard as an act of expres-
sion. But what is missing from each account is an explanation of what 
it is to express an emotion through gestures, actions, etc.
While neither AE nor HE includes a worked-out theory of expres-
sion in the primary sense, both views presuppose one. Levinson is more 
explicit on this, writing that to express an emotion is to reveal or make 
manifest an ‘inner’ emotional state through ‘outer’ signs such as “coun-
tenance, posture, bearing, demeanor, actions, gestures, and modifi ca-
tions of voice” (Levinson 2006: 193). Davies appears to be working with 
the same conception when he writes of a person’s behaviour “giv[ing] 
direct, primary expression to the person’s felt emotion” rather than 
merely producing an expressive appearance (Davies 2006: 183). While 
this might seem to be a commonsensical understanding of expression, 
it is too broad and thus risks confl ating distinct phenomena that may 
often go by the name ‘expression’ in ordinary discourse but which need 
to be disambiguated if we want to gain a clear and precise understand-
ing of expression in its primary sense, i.e., in the sense that is relevant 
for the current discussion. Moreover, and more importantly, whether 
or not AE and HE are in fact equivalent depends on their being read 
according to a sense of ‘expression’ that, I argue, should not be taken 
to be its primary sense, or at least not the sense that is primary for 
artistic expression.
The worry is that understanding expression broadly as the exter-
nalization, via behaviour, of a psychological state would include behav-
iour or actions that unintentionally or unconsciously manifest what 
someone is feeling, e.g., fi dgeting as a sign of restlessness or anxiety. 
Indeed, this applies to some of Davies’s central examples of character-
istically expressive behaviour: skipping as an expression of joy often 
occurs spontaneously rather than deliberately, and a slumped posture 
and slow, heavy tread are typically unconscious and not purposely ad-
opted by sad people. It clarifi es things if, following Roger Scruton, we 
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distinguish these types of outward manifestation as evincing rather 
than expressing emotion15—or perhaps it would be more precise to 
speak of betraying emotion, as Collingwood does (see Collingwood 
1938: 121–23).
One might think it that this distinction is suffi cient for clarity, and 
that the potential for confl ating expression with a similar activity could 
be avoided by defi ning expression, in its primary sense, as the inten-
tional or deliberate manifestation of a psychological or emotional state 
in some outward form, e.g., through gesture or behaviour. However, 
this would not yet solve the problem since we can also distinguish de-
liberately evincing an emotion from expressing it, where we can call 
deliberate evincing ‘emoting’ to distinguish it from a non-deliberate 
evincing or ‘betrayal’ of emotion. This distinction between expressing 
and emoting is made clear by Collingwood16 in his example of an ac-
tress who “when she is acting a pathetic scene … work[s] herself up to 
such an extent as to weep real tears” (Collingwood 1938: 122). He notes 
that merely exhibiting symptoms of grief, albeit deliberately, is not suf-
fi cient for expressing grief if the actress does not also “make it clear to 
herself and her audience what the tears are about,” since expression in 
the primary sense means “to explore [one’s] own emotions: to discover 
emotions in [oneself] of which [one] was unaware, and, by permitting 
the audience to witness the discovery, enable them to make a similar 
discovery about themselves” (Collingwood 1938: 122).
(In the next section I defend this account of expression in its pri-
mary sense, at least with regard to artistic expression. For now, note 
that one does not need to accept this defi nition to agree that there is 
a difference between, e.g., acting that merely presents, deliberately, 
the outward symptoms of an emotion—i.e., emoting—and expressive 
acting, which need not involve much of a display of symptoms, or at 
least not of those symptoms that are characteristically associated with 
evincing this emotion, in order to convey or make clear a character’s 
emotional state to the audience in a way that also conveys something 
about the state or the character.17)
Even if we do not yet have a worked-out and defended account of 
the primary sense of expression, once we distinguish expressing an 
emotion from both emoting (i.e., deliberately evincing an emotion) and 
betraying an emotion (i.e., unintentionally evincing it), it becomes clear 
15 See Scruton 1974: 214–16, especially his insistence that “the aesthetic 
concept of expression cannot be identifi ed with the non-aesthetic concept of natural 
expression (or evincing). A gesture is a natural expression of some feeling if it is a 
symptom of that feeling, and a symptom need not be expressive” (214, my emphasis).
16 Cf. Green 2016, who similarly distinguishes between what he calls expressing, 
representing, and showing.
17 For an example of the distinction between acting that expresses and acting 
that emotes, compare the performance of Stellan Skarsgård in the Norwegian fi lm 
Insomnia (dir. Erik Skjoldbjærg, 1997) with Al Pacino’s performance, in the same 
role, in the American remake of the same name (dir. Christopher Nolan, 2002).
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that AE confl ates expressing an emotion with betraying one, since the 
characteristically expressive behaviours it takes expressive music to 
resemble are examples of evincing an emotion, which are held to be 
characteristically expressive because such behaviours are typical of 
people who are betraying that emotion. This is why these behaviours 
would be chosen to be deliberately enacted by one who wanted to emote, 
e.g., sadness or joy, or why a composer or performer might choose to 
play music that resembled these behaviours in its dynamic character 
so as to evince that emotion through music, resulting in ‘emotive music’ 
rather than a musical expression, properly so called, of the emotion 
in question. It also becomes clear that HE is equivalent to AE only if 
HE shares this understanding of expression in its primary sense, i.e., 
if it takes the expression that an expressive piece of music is readily 
heard-as to be the imagined emoting or betraying of an emotion by a 
hypothetical persona. This is not an implausible way to read HE as 
Levinson presents it: Matravers, for one, takes Levinson to hold that 
“we experience [expressive] music as the intentional communication 
of an emotion by virtue of its manifesting signs associated with the 
betrayal of that emotion” (Matravers 2011: 11, my emphasis).
HE can be read in another way, however, and one that is consistent 
with some of the ways Levinson describes expressive music. This is to 
take HE to require us to hear a piece of music as if it were the expres-
sion, in the primary sense, of an emotion, rather than hearing it as 
resembling or imaginable-as such an expression. In other words, on 
this reading the music is heard as, or as if it were, itself a (musical) ges-
ture on the part of a persona who is imagined to be making the music 
to express—and not merely to evince—what he or she feels. Levinson 
articulates this view most clearly when he takes “[a]nother stab” at for-
mulating HE in one of his earlier papers on the topic, writing: “Music 
that expresses α is music that strikes us as how a person experiencing 
α would behaviourally express his or her α if persons naturally behaved 
‘in music’—i.e., if the physical gestures and resulting sounds involved 
in playing musical instruments were a natural (unlearned, unmedi-
ated) manifestation of human emotions” (Levinson 1990: 338fn5). Ad-
mittedly, this could still be read in terms of emoting or betrayal—e.g., 
by imagining a world in which people’s bodies naturally (i.e., automati-
cally or non-deliberately) sometimes made musical noises due to their 
feeling a certain emotion, similar to how our faces naturally turn red 
on some occasions when we feel anger or embarrassment.18 However, 
we need not imagine anything so extreme in order to realize the basic 
point behind this idea, which is the notion of expressing emotion direct-
ly by making music, and perhaps through gestures that are involved 
in producing certain sounds on certain instruments—e.g., the way one 
18 Cf. Walton 1994: 56, and Budd 1995: 132, for the interesting suggestion that 
we might hear expressive music “as a novel bodily means of sound production” 
(Levinson 2006: 194).
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needs to strike a drum or cymbal in order to produce a certain sound—
with these gestures being heard ‘in’ the music.
Needless to say, when HE is read in this way it no longer entails AE 
but is a distinct position, since it no longer involves imagining a per-
sona’s movements that share a dynamic contour with both the music 
and the emotion of which it is expressive. As well as being of greater 
philosophical interest, this reading of HE also gives us a more plausible 
account of musical expression than one based on resemblance to behav-
iours such as gait, posture, and the rest. This is because, at the level 
of generality that is involved in registering a resemblance between dy-
namic contours, there would seem to be no way to distinguish behav-
iour that expresses an emotion from emotive behaviour or behaviour 
that betrays an emotion when discerning which behaviour the contour 
of a given piece resembles. Unfortunately, Levinson appears not to 
have pursued this idea as far as he might have due to its initially being 
presented in relation to his claim of music having a sui generis form of 
expression, where he backed off from this idea in the face of criticisms 
that were raised against it. These criticisms do not count against the 
idea of expressing oneself through making music, since this need not be 
taken as sui generis in the objectionable sense of being a wholly unique 
mode of expression, and so this initial idea of Levinson’s is worth tak-
ing up again and exploring further.
Reading HE in this way gives us an explanation of musical expres-
siveness in terms of a disposition that some pieces have to be readily 
heard as the kind of music someone might make if they were expressing 
an emotion by making music (in that genre, with those instruments, 
etc.), with the imaginary persona being the hypothetical composer or 
performer of the music we are hearing—where this persona will coin-
cide with the actual composer or performer in cases where a piece of 
music (i) actually was an expression of the composer or performer’s 
emotion, and (ii) was heard as expressive of that emotion by a listener. 
Basing expressiveness on this understanding of expression in its pri-
mary sense, and moreover on the notion of expressing an emotion by 
making music, clarifi es that the real philosophical problem concerning 
musical expressiveness lies in explaining what it is to express an emo-
tion in and through music, as opposed to emoting or evincing an emo-
tion by means of music. Solving this problem requires us to have some 
account of artistic expression in general and to know how this would 
apply to music as a medium, and it is here that looking to Collingwood’s 
account of expression can help.
4. How Collingwood can help solve 
the ‘real problem’ of musical expression
One diffi culty for any appeal to Collingwood’s theory of art is that it 
has been frequently misconstrued in such a way as to make it seem 
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implausible, to the point where this misconstrual has come to be ac-
cepted by many, if not the majority, of philosophers of art. As such, 
it is worth showing that Collingwood’s theory is more plausible than 
this misreading allows so as not to turn off readers who might suspect 
that supplementing HE with Collingwood’s theory of expression might 
weaken the resulting account in terms of its plausibility and its explan-
atory value for actual instances of musical expression.19 The misread-
ing takes Collingwood to hold that artworks are mental objects existing 
solely within the minds of artists and audiences, with the tangible ob-
ject or event that is commonly called the work—e.g., a physical painting 
or sculpture, a dancer’s bodily movements through space, or in the case 
of music the sounds produced by instruments when played—being only 
contingently related to the real work of art as the means by which this 
work can be transmitted from the artist’s mind to the minds of audi-
ence members. Admittedly, some of Collingwood’s statements make it 
sound like this is what he is saying, especially when read outside their 
full context. However, Aaron Ridley and others have shown that despite 
these passages that seem to support the misconstrual, Collingwood does 
not hold this ‘ideal theory,’20 and that when he makes an apparently 
damning remark, e.g., that a musical work “is [a] tune in the composer’s 
head,” where “[t]he noises made by the performers, and heard by the 
audience, are not the music at all; they are only means by which the au-
dience, if they listen intelligently … can reconstruct for themselves the 
imaginary tune that existed in the composer’s head” (Collingwood 1938: 
139), he is not talking about a mental as opposed to a physical object but 
rather is making the point that a set of sounds is not music unless these 
sounds are heard together as forming a tune or pattern.
What, then, is Collingwood’s theory of artistic expression if not the 
‘ideal theory’ it is so often mistaken for? In brief, he takes expression to 
be the articulation of the felt or qualitative dimension of an experience, 
where this articulation is necessarily carried out in a medium—e.g., in 
paint, stone, gesture, sound, language, etc.—through a non-technical 
process in which the artist comes to discover the end she is working to-
wards (i.e., the completed artwork) in the process of creating it, rather 
than beginning with a clear conception of the work and then fi guring 
out the means to realize it. This articulation can also be understood 
as a clarifi cation of the artist’s pre-conscious feelings that brings them 
19 This suspicion would be unfounded in any case since, as an anonymous 
reviewer noted, the metaphysics of Collingwood’s theory of art, which is the part of 
his theory that is commonly misconstrued so as to make it seem implausible, can be 
separated from his account of expression. Even so, it seems worth taking a paragraph 
to note how this common reading is mistaken in order to avoid possible distraction 
or suspicion on the part of readers who are only familiar with Collingwood through 
this misconstrual.
20 See Ridley 1997 for his refutation of the ‘ideal theory’ reading, as well as D. 
Davies 2008 and Wiltshire 2018 for further defences of Collingwood’s theory that are 
compatible with a non-idealist reading. For the most infl uential presentation of the 
idealist interpretation of Collingwood (i.e., the misconstrual), see Wollheim 1972.
D. Collins, Davies and Levinson on the Musical Expression of Emotion 87
to conscious awareness, making them comprehensible, or graspable in 
thought, for the artist and her audience alike.
The process of expression begins with an indeterminate feeling at 
what Collingwood calls the ‘psychical’ level of experience. This is some-
thing like a pre-conscious, embodied registering of sensations and affects 
occurring at the fringes of awareness, with sensations and their affective 
charges together being what Collingwood calls ‘feelings’. At this point, 
precisely what one feels remains indeterminate; as Collingwood writes, 
“When a man is said to express emotion … [at] fi rst, he is conscious 
of having an emotion, but not conscious of what this emotion is. All he 
is conscious of is a perturbation or excitement, which he feels going on 
within him, but of whose nature he is ignorant. While in this state, all he 
can say about his emotion is: ‘I feel … I don’t know what I feel’” (Collin-
gwood 1938: 109). Expressing this feeling involves fi rst directing one’s 
attention to it, which in Collingwood’s terms ‘raises it to consciousness’—
or, we could say, shifts the focus of our attention so that the feeling is 
no longer on the ‘fringe’ of our awareness but closer to the centre. This 
allows one to apprehend and fi x the psychical feeling before one’s mind, 
which makes the feeling more determinate and available for thought 
and refl ection, although at this stage the feeling is not yet clarifi ed.
Once the feeling has begun to be consciously grasped, the artist can 
start to get clear on what, precisely, she feels by articulating this feel-
ing in a medium and turning it into an ‘emotion for consciousness.’ 
The emotion is articulated when the initially pre-conscious and inde-
terminate ‘psychical’ feelings are given form in the chosen medium; we 
might say that the emotion is now embodied in the perceptible form, 
with perceiving the fi nal form being identical with consciously appre-
hending the clarifi ed emotion (cf. Sias and Bar-On 2016). Because this 
is a non-technical process with the artist not yet being fully aware of 
the nature of her emotion, she must proceed, as Ridley (2003: 222) 
notes, by feeling her way along, continuing to attend to the qualita-
tive aspects of her experience as she engages and interacts with her 
medium. Collingwood gives an example of a painter stepping back to 
observe his work as it develops and making adjustments and revisions 
in response to what he sees, thinking as he goes “I am not satisfi ed with 
that line; let us try it this way … and this way … and this way … there! 
that will do!” (Collingwood 1938: 281). Likewise, a writer in the process 
of composing a poem will try out certain words and phrases, varying 
their order or substituting certain words with others, changing their 
punctuation and spacing, etc. until she arrives at the precise form that 
she apprehends as being ‘just right.’
With the basic elements of Collingwood’s account of expression now 
outlined,21 we are able to explain what it would be to express, rather 
than just to evince, an emotion in and through music. This would be 
21 See Ridley 2003: 222–25 for another summary of the basics of Collingwood’s 
theory, which Ridley contrasts with transmission and resemblance-based theories of 
expression, presenting it as ‘expression proper.’
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a matter of articulating an initially vague feeling—the qualitative or 
affective aspect of an experience—by producing or combining sounds 
in such a way so as to give this feeling audible form and thereby make 
it available for a listener’s awareness as a determinate emotion. While 
there would be no single way for this articulation to proceed, two ex-
amples will clarify the sort of activity this might involve in practice.
(1) A musician has long been fascinated by a particular piece, sens-
ing that the composition has greater aesthetic potential than he 
has so far been able to realize in his performances of it, although 
he cannot yet say precisely in what this potential consists. Re-
hearsing this piece for yet another performance, he experiments 
with different ways of playing it, making slight adjustments in 
certain passages. Through trying out a number of these varia-
tions, guided by instinct and a feeling that he will know what 
he is looking to achieve when he hears it, he starts to develop a 
better idea of this intuited potential by getting a feel for which 
variations seem on the right track and which do not. Eventu-
ally, through trial and error, he becomes aware of just what the 
potential was that he sensed in the piece, where his becoming 
aware of this is identical with his fi rst playing the piece in a par-
ticular way and recognizing it as being what he was looking for: 
this new performance successfully expresses how he feels about 
the piece.
(2) A composer who is setting out to write a new piece without feel-
ing particularly inspired is playing around on her piano when a 
certain arrangement of notes that she happened to play strike 
her as sounding particularly evocative—but of what she cannot 
say. As she explores ways of developing and elaborating upon 
this musical phrase, riffi ng on and modifying it so that it ends 
up being very different from the notes she initially played while 
retaining, and amplifying, the initial feeling that struck her, she 
becomes aware that the song she is writing expresses elements 
of her mood that morning, making it more clear to her how she 
had been feeling when she sat down to compose.
With this explanation of what it would be to express an emotion by 
making music, we can also say what it would be to hear a piece of 
music as doing this and thereby complete the non-resemblance-based 
understanding of HE discussed above. A piece of music is expressive of 
an emotion, on this account, if and only if it is readily heard by quali-
fi ed listeners as (or as if it were) the result of a process of articulating 
an initially indistinct sensation or affect that gives it a determinate 
perceptible (audible) form in an arrangement of sounds in which it is 
embodied. Note that this does not require a piece to be an expression 
in order for it to be expressive, only that it be readily heard as one, i.e., 
that it is conducive to being imagined as the (musical) expression of a 
hypothetical persona. This could be a matter of imagining a composer 
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or performer expressing a feeling through writing or performing the 
piece in question in just the way it is heard, and imagining an emo-
tional state of the composer’s or performer’s that corresponds to and is 
articulated by the piece the listener hears. This could also be a matter 
of a piece being conducive to being heard in fresh ways on multiple oc-
casions, so that a listener is able to imagine that the new elements and 
dimensions of the piece that she ‘discovers’ upon a repeat listening cor-
respond to newly clarifi ed aspects of the feeling that a hypothetical per-
sona is articulating for the fi rst time via the music, perhaps identifying 
this persona with herself and imagining that she is articulating her 
own feelings through the music as she hears these new elements in it.
One worry that arises for this explanation is that it risks making 
the ability to register music as expressive rare, since being a ‘qualifi ed 
listener’ would seem to require that one be familiar with music from 
the standpoint of a composer or performer in order to be aware of the 
expressive possibilities offered by the medium. Including the ‘qualifi ed 
listener’ requirement in the defi nition means that some listeners might 
not be positioned to experience a piece of music as expressive, being 
limited to music merely arousing emotion or reminding them of one 
by evincing it in the way AE posits, although I do not think we need to 
worry that it would restrict the former ability to musicians and musi-
cologists. Even if not everyone has experience with composing music or 
playing an instrument, nearly everyone has direct personal experience 
making sounds and being aware of what it feels like to make them, and 
moreover what it feels like to hear them as one is making them,22 where 
this is plausibly suffi cient to allow us to have some sense of what it 
might feel like for us to make some other sound, e.g., one on an instru-
ment that we do not actually play, and so what we might be expressing 
by making that sound. This is compatible, of course, with the view that 
the more experienced one is in playing, composing, or studying music 
the more likely one will be to have a better sense of the expressiveness 
of a piece, which I think is also plausible.
Another worry about this explanation is that it is still too vague, 
since it does not tell us exactly what the expression of various emotions 
through music will involve in a way that would allow us to recognize 
musical expressions for what they are when we hear them, where one 
might think that AE succeeds in doing this by telling us that sad mu-
sic typically will sound slow, heavy, downbeat, descending, etc. This 
objection is, I think, mistaken, since it assumes both that the emo-
tions that artworks express are general types—i.e., what Collingwood 
calls “thing[s] of a certain kind”—instead of being particular feelings 
that are uniquely expressed by a particular work—i.e., what he calls 
“certain thing[s]” (Collingwood 1938: 114)—and that just what will be 
22 Cf. Collingwood’s point that every speaker is also conscious of him- or herself 
as speaking, and so is both a speaker and the fi rst member of his or her audience 
(Collingwood 1938: 247–51).
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involved in expressing an emotion can be known and specifi ed in ad-
vance of its expression. This is to treat artistic expression on the model 
of what Collingwood calls ‘craft’ rather than as art, where artworks and 
their expressiveness are not determinable in this way since expression 
just is the process of clarifying what is not yet clear.
Moreover, the fact that AE can specify in advance what a song that 
is expressive of sadness, joy, etc. will typically sound like shows that it 
assumes a craft-based or technical conception of art, whereas on Collin-
gwood’s account there is nothing that it characteristically sounds, or 
looks, like for a artwork to express, as opposed to evince, an emotion. 
I take the plausibility of this conclusion to be another point in favour 
of Collingwood’s account of expression, as well as a point in favour of 
HE as an explanation of musical expressiveness since it can be read as 
compatible with Collingwood’s account in a way that AE cannot.
5. Conclusion
I have argued above for three main points: (i) that AE and HE are com-
patible and extensionally equivalent theories of musical expressive-
ness when read according to the understanding of the primary sense 
of expression with which Davies and Levinson are most readily taken 
to be operating, and that as such there is no genuine debate to be had 
between them; (ii) that HE can be read in another way according to 
which it is not equivalent to AE and is more philosophically interest-
ing, although incomplete; and (iii) that Collingwood’s theory of expres-
sion can be used to complete HE by explaining what expressing an 
emotion in and through music would involve.
One virtue of looking to Collingwood for an explanation of expres-
sion in its primary sense is that his account—when not misconstrued 
as the ‘ideal theory’—takes artworks to embody the emotions they ex-
press in perceptual form,23 and so is compatible with Levinson’s exter-
nality and immediacy requirements for expressiveness. Another is that 
HE, read in terms of hearability-as-expression-in-music and according 
to Collingwood’s account of expression, can meet many of the objections 
commonly brought against both expression and resemblance theories 
of expressiveness. Some of these are discussed above; two that are not 
are those that Kania (2017: §3.1) identifi es as the main problems for 
expression theories of musical expression. First, HE on this reading 
allows that a composer or performer might not themselves feel an emo-
tion that the music they make is expressive of, since not every expres-
sive piece of music needs actually to be a musical expression but needs 
23 When a work is one of the rare few that Collingwood does allow could be 
created entirely ‘in the artist’s head’— such as a short poem or tune that the artist 
does not need to write down, speak, or play in order to fully work out—it will still 
have a form that is imagined as quasi-perceptible (e.g., the artist imagining hearing 
it played, seeing the words on the page, etc.) and so in principle could be externalized 
and made publicly available to others.
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only be readily heard as if it were one. Second, it allows for a composer 
to fail to express her emotions in a piece she writes since it does not tie 
a piece’s expressiveness to what an artist is actually feeling, but only 
to its hearability as the kind of music that someone who was feeling 
this might plausibly make to express it. This suggests that a success-
ful musical expression must also be expressive in the sense of being 
readily heard by listeners as the expression that it in fact is, which is 
a philosophically interesting and, I think, plausible element of artistic 
expression—but one that should be explored in a future paper.24
References
Budd, M. 1995. Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music. London: Penguin.
Cochrane, T. 2010a. “A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity.” Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 191–207.
Cochrane, T. 2010b. “Using the Persona to Express Complex Emotions in 
Music.” Music Analysis 29: 264–75.
Collingwood, R. G. 1938. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Collingwood, R. G. 1939. An Autobiography. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cone, E. T. 1974. The Composer’s Voice. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Davies, D. 2008. “Collingwood’s ‘Performance’ Theory of Art.” British Jour-
nal of Aesthetics 48: 162–74.
Davies, S. 1994. Musical Meaning and Expression. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Davies, S. 1999. “Response to Robert Stecker.” British Journal of Aesthetics 
39: 282–87.
Davies, S. 2006. “Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music.” In 
M. Kieran (ed.). Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy 
of Art. Oxford: Blackwell: 179–91.
Green, M. 2016. “Expressing, Showing and Representing.” In C. Abell and 
J. Smith (eds.). The Expression of Emotion: Philosophical, Psychological 
and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 25–45.
Kania, A. 2017. “The Philosophy of Music.” In E. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online: URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2017/entries/music/>.
Karl, G. and Robinson, J. 1997. “Shostakovitch’s Tenth Symphony and the 
Musical Expression of Cognitively Complex Emotions.” In J. Robinson 
(ed.). Music and Meaning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 54–78.
Kivy, P. 1989. Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions In-
cluding the Complete Text of The Corded Shell. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press.
Langer, S. 1953. Feeling and Form. New York: Scribner’s.
Levinson, J. 1990. “Hope in The Hebrides.” In J. Levinson, Music, Art, and 
Metaphysics. 2011 re-issue. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 336–75.
24 Thanks to David Davies, Moe Touizrar, and the audience at the 2014 meeting 
of the Canadian Society for Aesthetics, especially James Young and John Brown, for 
their feedback on the ideas and arguments in this paper.
92 D. Collins, Davies and Levinson on the Musical Expression of Emotion
Levinson, J. 1996. “Musical Expressiveness.” In J. Levinson, The Pleasures 
of Aesthetics. Ithaca Cornell University Press: 90–125.
Levinson, J. 2006. “Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-as-expression.” 
In M. Kieran (ed.). Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philoso-
phy of Art. Oxford: Blackwell: 192–204.
Matravers, D. 1998. Art and Emotion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Matravers, D. 2007. “Musical Expressiveness.” Philosophy Compass 2/3: 
373–79.
Matravers, D. 2010. “Recent Philosophical Work on the Connection be-
tween Music and the Emotions.” Music Analysis 29: 8–18.
Ridley, A. 1997. “Not Ideal: Collingwood’s Expression Theory.” The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55: 263–72.
Ridley, A. 2003. “Expression in Art.” In J. Levinson (ed.). The Oxford Hand-
book of Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 211–27.
Robinson, J. 1994. “The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music.” The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52: 13–22.
Robinson, J. 2005. Deeper than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, 
Music, and Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sias, J. and Bar-On, D. 2016. “Emotions and Their Expressions.” In C. 
Abell and J. Smith (eds.). The Expression of Emotion: Philosophical, 
Psychological and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press: 46–72.
Scruton, R. 1974. Art and Imagination. 1998 re-issue. South Bend: St. Au-
gustine’s Press.
Tormey, A. 1971. The Concept of Expression. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Vermazen, B. 1986. “Expression as Expression.” Pacifi c Philosophical 
Quarterly 67: 196–224.
Walton, K. 1994. “Listening with Imagination: Is Music Representational?” 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52: 47–61.
Wiltshire, N. 2018. “Feeling, Emotion and Imagination: In Defence of 
Collingwood’s Expression Theory of Art.” British Journal for the History 
of Philosophy 26: 759–81.
Wollheim, R. 1972. “On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood’s Aesthet-
ic.” In M. Krausz (ed.). Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collin-
gwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 68–78.
Young, J. O. 2014. Critique of Pure Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
